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Pending EU widening to the East has revived concerns in Lalin America that
Europe may become more inward-looking. However, booming trade and foreign
direct investment (FDI) relations between current EU members and Central and
Eastern European countries (CEECs) are unlikely to harm I^itin America. Trade
patterns suggest that Latin America's exports to the EU are complementary to the
exports of CEECs. Moreover, the recent surge of FDI flows to various host
countries, including several Latin American economies, indicates that new
investment opportunities in CEECs induce additional FDI, rather than causing
diversion of FDI. This picture is unlikely to change significantly once some
CEECs become members of the EU. The paper concludes that future economic
relations between Latin America and the EU depend primarily on sustained
economic policy reforms in Latin America and the EU's role in multilateral trade
negotiations, rather than on EU widening per se.
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REFERENCES 31I. INTRODUCTION
The widening of the EU to the East may involve a dilemma for L^atin America. On
the one hand, Latin America should be interested in a successful EU integration
of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs).
1 Latin American exporters
could find new buoyant markets in CEECs, if economic transition and EU
integration proceed smoothly. By contrast, if EU widening to the East were to
fail, this would most likely result in economic and political destabilisation of
CEECs. The adverse repercussions of such a failure may well spread beyond
Western Europe. Non-EU members may become the victims of economic and
political tension between the EU and CEECs. This is because the EU would be a
less reliable partner with regard to its trade and investment relations to all non-
members, including Latin America.
On the other hand, the pending widening of the EU has revived concerns that
Europe may become more inward-looking. In many Latin American countries, the
perception of being discriminated vis-a-vis domestic EU suppliers and privileged
trading partners of the EU is deeply rooted. Adverse effects of discrimination are
indeed to be expected if the prospective EU members among CEECs are direct
competitors of Latin America in exporting to, and attracting foreign direct
investment (FDI) from the EU.
For a similar line of reasoning, see Langhammer and Nunnenkamp (1993).Concerns about trade and FDI diversion resulting from EU widening to the
East are justified in principle. For various reasons, however, Latin America is
rather unlikely to be affected by significant diversion effects. This proposition
will be substantiated in the following, first by analysing recent trade patterns
(Section II), and second by discussing the issue of competition for FDI from the
EU (Section III). The evaluation takes into account that recent trends may change
once some CEECs become full EU members. The conclusion is that economic
relations between Latin America and the EU are most likely to prosper if EU
integration proceeds smoothly and Latin America sustains economic policy
reforms.
II. THE PATTERN OF EU IMPORTS: WHY TRADE PREFERENCES
ARE NO SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION
1. Booming East-West Trade: A Case of Trade Diversion?
CEECs have benefited from an unprecedented shift in the EU's trade policy
stance. In the socialist era, CEECs were seriously constrained in terms of market
access to the EU. They faced high tariffs, quantitative restrictions and a wide
range of contingent protection measures. At that time, CEECs ranked at the
bottom of the pyramid of trade preferences granted by the EU to various groups
of countries (Hiemenz et al. 1994: 18ff). The liberalisation of East-West trade
began in 1988 (when the EU concluded a trade and cooperation agreement withHungary), but the major change came in 1991: The "Europe Agreements"
promoted the former CSFR, Hungary and Poland to the top of the pyramid of
trade preferences.
The shift from discriminatory to preferential treatment has certainly supported
the boom of EU imports from CEECs. EU imports from a group of seven
CEECs
2 increased fivefold from 1986 to 1995 (OECD, var. iss.). Though starting
from a higher level, EU imports from Latin America just doubled during the same
period. In 1995, imports from the seven CEECs exceeded imports from all Latin
American economies. It is not unreasonable to assume that the trend of
considerably faster growth of EU imports from CEECs will continue, considering
that some of them will join the EU soon.
Yet, it is open to question whether booming EU imports from CEECs were
(and will be) at the expense of other trading partners in general, and Latin
America in particular. Likewise, it is debatable to which extent booming imports
were due to preferential access of CEECs to EU markets. Historical trade
patterns of the inter-war period as well as the simulation of "normal" trade
patterns3 suggest that CEECs would direct the largest share of their exports to
Western Europe. It is for two reasons that exports of CEECs to the EU fell short
2 Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovak Republic.
3 This is done by using gravity models which consider economic size and distance as the
major determinants of the direction of trade; see, e.g., Piazolo (1996).of the "normal" pattern until the early 1990s: Apart from the aforementioned trade
restrictions of the EU, CEECs suffered from a deteriorating supply capacity under
conditions of central planning. In other words, economic transformation of
CEECs would most likely have resulted in rising exports to the EU even if
preferential market access had not been granted by the EU.
This implies that the increase in EU imports from CEECs may reflect trade
creation, rather than preference-induced trade diversion.
4 It is almost impossible
to empirically assess the relative importance of trade creation and trade diversion.
However, the subsequent evaluation suggests that the EU's trade policies towards
CEECs are of minor importance in explaining Latin America's competitive
position on EU goods markets.
2. CEECs and Latin America: Competing Suppliers on EU Markets?
Trade diversion to the detriment of Latin America would be most likely if
substitution elasticities between (preferred) CEEC suppliers and (non-preferred)
Latin American suppliers in EU markets were high. As substitution elasticities are
difficult to measure, trade overlap indices are often considered as proxies
(Langhammer 1994). Comparing the commodity structure of EU imports from
Piazolo (1996: 25) concludes from a comparison of revealed comparative advantage of
CEECs vis-a-vis the EU on the one hand, and vis-a-vis all trading partners on the other
hand that "regional integration benefiting intra-group trade is unlikely to lead to substantial
distortions".CEECs and Latin America reveals a surprisingly low degree of overlapping. Most
strikingly perhaps, manufactured goods accounted for 70 percent of total EU
imports from CEECs in 1994, while the share of manufactures in EU imports
from Latin America was just 20 percent (Table 1).
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Source: OECD (var. iss.).
One may suspect that the significant increase in the share of manufactures in
EU imports from CEECs since 1989 has hindered Latin America to reduce the
strong bias in favour of non-manufactures (such as food products, crude materials
and other commodities) in its exports to the EU. It is indeed striking that, in
contrast to EU imports from Latin America, imports of the United States from thisregion shifted considerably towards manufactures in the early 1990s.5 However,
several observations are in conflict with the above suspicion:
- The share of manufactures in Latin America's exports was about 50 percent
lower in the F.U market than in the US market even before CEECs were
granted a privileged status by the EU (UN 1996).
- On the level of particular manufacturing industries, there is little evidence that
shifts in the structure of EU imports from CEECs were related to shifts in the
structure of EU imports from Latin America.6 The shares of chemicals,
machinery and transport equipment, and textiles, clothing and leather in
manufactured EU imports from Latin America all declined slightly, irrespective
of the direction of change in the share of these items in manufactured EU
imports from CEECs (Table 1).
- Finally, for the bulk of manufactures, access to EU markets is largely unre-
stricted for Latin American suppliers. Put differently, preference margins
favouring CEECs play a marginal role in large parts of manufacturing. This is
The share of manufactures in US imports from Latin America nearly doubled from 31
percent in 1990 to 60 percent in 1994 (UN 1996).
Table 1 includes three prototype manufacturing industries: the chemical industry which is
relatively physical capital intensive; machinery and transport equipment where production
technologies tend to be relatively skill intensive; and textiles, clothing and leather the
production of which is relatively (unskilled) labour intensive.also because about 60 percent of Latin American exports of processed and
semi-processed goods to the EU actually enter EU markets duty-free or with
reduced duties under the Generalized System of Preferences (EUROSTAT
1995).
The latter argument suggests a closer look at trade overlaps in so-called
sensitive areas. Notably for steel, textiles and agricultural products, EU imports
have traditionally been quota-restricted. It is primarily in these areas that various
CEECs were granted preferential treatment by the EU, which may have caused
trade diversion. Yet, empirical analyses revealed rather small overlaps in the
supply of CEECs and Latin America in quota-restricted EU markets
(Langhammer 1994).
As concerns steel, trade overlaps in the late 1980s and early 1990s were
basically due to competition between Brazil and the former USSR in special steel
products. However, declining market shares of Brazil in this period cannot be
explained by preference margins, but have to be attributed to price underbidding
by successor states of the USSR. Trade diversion caused in this way diminished
since 1992/93: The EU enforced "orderly marketing behaviour", imposed
quantitative restrictions on steel imports from CIS republics, and subjected steel
imports from the Czech and Slovak Republics to tariff quotas (WTO 1995: 59).
Latin America and CEECs became subject to a "managed trade" strategy of theEU, in order to protect both domestic steel producers and traditional trading
partners against allegedly dumped steel imports. As a matter of fact, the share of
iron and steel in total exports to the EU declined for both Latin America and
CEECs7
Likewise, Latin America does not appear to have suffered from considerable
trade diversion with respect to textiles and clothing. True, Latin America's share
in EU imports of textiles and clothing (SITC categories 65 and 84) from all
non-OECD sources declined from 2.9 percent in 1989 to 1.7 percent in 1994,
while the share of CEECs more than doubled to 16.2 percent (OECD, var. iss.).
8
However, the decline in Latin America's market share was even more pronounced
in the 1980s,
9 i.e., before CEECs became the most favoured trading partner of
the EU. Moreover, in 1989-1994, Latin America experienced a similar decline in
7 In 1989, iron and steel accounted for 7 percent of total EU imports from CEECs and 3.2
percent of total EU imports from Latin America; the respective shares declined to 5.5 and
1.4 percent in 1994 (OECD, var. iss.).
8 Soaring EU imports of textiles and clothing from CEECs appear to be largely due to
outward processing activities of EU companies in CEECs (Nunnenkamp et al. 1994: 76).
By contrast, outward processing trade does not play a significant role in Latin America's
exports to the EU. This implies that trade patterns in textiles and clothing are biased in
favour of CEECs, considering that processed re-exports to the EU are inflated by imports
of unprocessed inputs from the EU.
9 In 1980, Latin America accounted for 5.8 percent of EU imports of textiles and clothing
from all non-OECD sources (OECD, var. iss.).its share in EU imports of all manufactures (from 7.1 to 4.5 percent; see Annex
Table). This implies that preferential treatment of imports of textiles and clothing
from CEECs does not provide a sufficient explanation of Latin America's poor
performance. This is also because preferences granted to CEHCs were less
significant than suggested by the removal of quantitative restrictions: Similar to
steel, preference-induced trade diversion in favour of imports of textiles and
clothing from CEECs was contained by persistent trade monitoring by the EU.
The remaining preferences will be further reduced once international trade in
textiles and clothing becomes subject to WTO discipline, as was agreed upon in
the Uruguay Round.
Arguably, the value of trade preferences granted to CHECs was particularly
high for products covered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
Nevertheless, the degree of trade diversion affecting Latin America does not
appear to be as substantial as is widely believed (Langhammer 1994):
1(
) l-'irst,
CAP products exported by CEECs in 1992 amounted to less than one third of
Koester (1996) analyses in detail the impact of the EU's agricultural policy towards
CEECs on developing countries. He finds that "LDCs will certainly be somewhat
negatively affected by the increase in preferential exports of the CEECs to the HU .... Yet
this effect is most likely to be .. marginal as LDCs sell a set of products which only
compete indirectly through cross-price effects with products supplied from the CEECs"
(Koester 1996: 174).10
CAP products exported by Latin America.
1
1 Second, trade overlaps in food
supply on RU markets by CEECs on the one hand and Latin America on the other
hand were even smaller than for steel and textiles. Third, similar to textiles,
preference margins in favour of CEECs will be reduced once the Uruguay Round
agreements on agriculture are implemented completely.
3. Latin America's Position on EU Markets: Who Is to Be Blamed?
Changes in the regional structure of EU imports from all non-OECD countries
support the view that Latin America's relatively poor performance on EU markets
cannot be attributed to closer institutional ties with, and trade preferences for
CEECs. If discriminatory trade policies of the EU had been the major factor
shaping changes in market shares, Asian suppliers should have been the first to
suffer from trade diversion. This is because Asian countries, notably the newly
industrialising economies in Asia, were a major target of discriminatory trade
policy instruments applied by the EU (such as export restraint agreements and
anti-dumping measures) (Hiemenzet al. 1994: 65-67).
1
2
EU imports of food, beverages and tobacco suggest that Latin America has remained a
more important supplier than CEECs. In 1994, CEECs (including the former USSR)
exported about US$ 3 billion of these items to the EU, compared to Latin American
exports of US$ 13.5 billion (UN 1996).
Recent anti-dumping investigations concerned various Asian suppliers, including India,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand (WTO 1995).Nonetheless, Asia further strengthened its dominant position among non-
OECD suppliers of manufactured goods on EU markets in 1989-1994 (Figure 1;
for details see Annex Table).
13 Asia gained market shares in capital and skill
intensive industries such as chemicals and machinery and transport equipment,
while its market share declined somewhat with respect to labour intensive EU
imports of textiles, clothing and leather. In sharp contrast to Asia, Latin America's
competitive position on EU markets deteriorated in 1989-1994. This applies to
both total trade and trade in manufactures. Furthermore, Latin America's market
share declined across various manufacturing industries (see Annex Table).
EU trade policies in general, and preferential treatment of CliECs in particular,
cannot explain the contrasting performance of non-favoured trading partners in
penetrating EU markets. Latin America lost market shares to other trading
partners of the EU, irrespective of whether these trading partners had privileged
access to EU markets (CEECs) or were subject to discriminatory treatment by the
EU (Asian countries). It follows that the blame for Latin America's poor
performance on EU markets has to be put on domestic supply constraints in the
first place. Especially in manufacturing, the legacy of lasting import substitution
policies may be responsible for such constraints. Import substitution policies
For a detailed analysis, see Aganval, Langhammer, Liicke and Nunnenkamp (1995).12









AF = Africa (excl. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Rep. of South Africa);
AS = Asia (excl. Middle East);
CEE = Central and Eastern Europe (excl. Community of Independent States);
LA = Latin America;
MM = Maghreb and Mashrek countries (excl. Lebanon);
ROW = Rest of non-OECD.
Source: See Annex Table.
impaired the international competitiveness of Latin American manufacturers. The
effectiveness of recent trade policy reforms in overcoming this problem may have
been subject to considerable lags. The overriding role of domestic economic
policy is also evident when it comes to explaining FDI patterns, to which we turn
next.Instituts fur Weltwirfschofe
13
III. OUTWARD FDI BY THE EU: WHY A ZERO-SUM GAME IS
UNLIKELY
1. CEECs as New Competitors for FDI: A Threat to Latin America?
Latin America has traditionally been the dominant host region of FDI from the
EU in the non-OECD area. About 45 percent of FDI stocks of the four major EU
investor countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom)
in all non-OECD countries were located in Latin America in 1985 and 1990
(Figure 2). About 60 percent of FDI flows from six EU countries
1
4 to the non-
OECD area were channelled to Latin America in 1985-1987 (OECD 1996).




















South and East Asia Centra] and Eastern Europe
aFrance, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; non-OECD includes Mexico. —
t>1987 for France and the United Kingdom.
Source: OECD (1996).
Flow data are also available for Denmark and Spain. OECD data for the remaining EU
countries are either incomplete, inconsistent or completely lacking (OECD 1996).14
CEECs were practically non-existent as competitors for FDI until the demise of
socialism. In 1985-1987, six EU countries invested a meagre annual average of
US$ 20 million in Central and Eastern Europe, compared to US$ 2.5 billion in
Latin America (OECD 1996). Figure 2 shows that FDI stocks of the EU in this
region were exceptionally low until recently.
However, CEECs experienced a boom of inward FDI since they started to
transform themselves into market economies. FDI inflows from (six) EU
countries soared thirteenfold to US$ 2.7 billion in 1994 (Figure 3). By contrast,
FDI flows from the EU to Latin America remained considerably below the
inflows of 1990 in the three subsequent years, and increased substantially only in
1994.
Figure 3 — FDI Flows from Six EU Countries to Selected Regions
8, 1990-1994
Bill. ECU
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
aDenmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. — ^Excluding
Middle East. —
 cCentral and Eastern Europe, including former USSR.
Source: OECD (1996).15
Especially the prospective EU members among CEECs can be expected to
become even more attractive hosts of FDI in the future. Previous steps towards
closer EU integration have promoted FDI in EU member countries in several
instances. Spain, for example, emerged as a major host country of FDI after the
country had joined the EU in 1986.
1
5 For the EU as a whole, the Internal Market
programme provided a major stimulus to intra-regional FDI flows (Agarwal,
Hiemenz and Nunnenkamp 1995).
16
All this seems to suggest that Latin America has much to lose as a host of FDI.
Similar to trade, however, the region's attractiveness for FDI has little to do with
EU integration and the emergence of prospective EU members as new
competitors for FDI. This proposition is supported by a closer inspection of
recent FDI patterns in the next section. Moreover, the subsequent discussion of
investors' motivations underlying different types of FDI reveals that FDI diversion




5 FDI flows from all sources to Spain soared from ECU 2.6 billion in 1985/86 to ECU
5.6 billion in 1987/88 and ECU 11.8 billion in 1989/90 (annual averages). The increase
was particularly pronounced for FDI flows from other EU members to Spain, which
increased more than sixfold to ECU 7.3 billion in 1989/90 (OECD 1996).
16 The intra-EU share of total FDI outflows of EU countries doubled from 31 percent in
1985-1987 to 63 percent in 1990-1992.
17 In contrast to trade diversion, the notion of FDI diversion lacks analytical foundation. We
use this term as a catchword indicating possible effects of fiercer competition for FDI on
traditional recipients of FDI.
c16
2. FDI in Latin America: How to Explain Impaired Attractiveness?
Various empirical observations are in conflict with the idea that Latin America
has been affected significantly by FDI diversion resulting from EU integration and
closer ties between the EU and CEECs. First, if FDI diversion had been a major
factor, all non-OECD hosts should have suffered from improved attractiveness of
CEECs. In particular, developing Asia should not have fared better as a host
region of FDI than Latin America. Yet, the most dramatic shifts in the regional
distribution of FDI in all non-OECD countries occurred exactly between these
two regions (Gundlach and Nunnenkamp 1996: Figure 1): East Asia's share in
global FDI flows has nearly quadrupled since 1980, whereas Latin America
reported significantly declining shares. This pattern also holds for outward FDI by
the EU. Although EU investors have traditionally been underrepresented in Asia,
the shift from Latin America to Asia is evident from Figures 2 and 3J8
Second, Latin America's loss in attractiveness for FDI occurred mainly in the
1980s, i.e., before FDI diversion in favour of CEECs could have played any role.
The region's share in global FDI flows collapsed from 12.6 percent in 1979-1982
to less than 4 percent in 1990 (IMF, var. iss.). Even more strikingly, Latin
FDI flows from six EU countries to Asia amounted to less than one third of their FDI
flows to Latin America in 1990. This ratio increased to almost 90 percent when comparing
average annual FDI flows in 1993/94 (Figure 3). For a more detailed analysis, see EC and
UNCTAD (1996).17
America's share in global FDI flows recovered exactly when CEECs entered the
scene as new competitors for FDI. Latin America's share remained persistently
lower in 1991-1995 than in 1979-1982, but, on average, it doubled relative to
1990.
Third, the recent increase of overall FDI flows to Latin America is mainly
because of booming FDI from the United States (IADB and IRELA 1996: Table
11). Recently, however, also EU investors expanded their engagement in the
region (Figure 3). The relatively modest increase of FDI flows from Europe
1
9 is
unlikely to reflect FDI diversion, unless one would argue that this increase would
have been more pronounced if CEECs had not attracted rising FDI from the EU
(which cannot be proven). Rather, US FDI in Latin America generally appears to
be more volatile than EU FDI in this region: The boom of FDI from the United
States started from a depressed level in 1985-1989, whereas European FDI flows
to Latin America were even somewhat higher in 1985-1989 than in 1980-1984.
Finally, the performance of Latin America in attracting FDI differed




9 According to data provided by IADB and IRELA (1996: Table 11), European FDI flows
to Latin America throughout the period 1990-1994 were 65 percent higher than in the
second half of the 1980s. In comparison, FDI from the United States increased sevenfold.
20 For a detailed analysis and'data sources, see Nunnenkamp (1997a).18
- Traditionally by far the most important recipient of FDI inflows in the region,
Brazil reported a steeply declining share in FDI flows from all sources to Latin
America.
- Mexico and, recently, also Argentina surpassed Brazil in terms of total FDI
inflows.
- Chile and Argentina proved to be most attractive with respect to average
annual FDI inflows per capita in 1991-1995.
Brazil continued to be the most important recipient of FDI flows from the EU
(Table 2). Nevertheless, FDI flows from the EU shifted remarkably towards other
Latin American host countries. Similar to global FDI flows, Argentina and
Mexico (in the 1990s) and Chile (since the early 1980s) were major beneficiaries
of higher FDI flows from the EU.
2
1 These shifts seem to be closely related to
economic policies pursued by the respective governments (Nunnenkamp 1997a).
Note, for example, that Chile represents the frontrunner with respect to economic
reforms in Latin America. The link between the timing of reforms and improved
attractiveness for FDI is also evident for Argentina and Mexico. It follows that
21 The increasing share of the remaining part of Latin America suggests that EU investors
strengthened their engagement also in various smaller economies within the region.
Examples include: Jamaica, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago (IADB and IRELA 1996:
..-•.Statistical Annex, Table 23).19



























Source: IADB and IRELA (1996: Table 23).




To summarize, FDI diversion resulting from European integration appears to
have been a minor factor in shaping recent FDI patterns. Both global and
European FDI has been far from being a zero-sum game. Various Latin American
economies have restored their attractiveness for FDI exactly when CEECs
emerged as new competitors for FDI. Countries in both regions benefited from
additional FDI at the same time, after they had implemented stabilisation and
structural adjustment programmes. Recent shifts in the distribution of FDI across
regions and among Latin American economies bear close resemblance to the
timing and consistency of economic reforms.
2
2 For a detailed analysis of the case of Brazil, see Nunnenkamp (1997b).20
3. Motivations of EU Investors: Biased Against Latin America?
The next question is whether FDI diversion to the detriment of Latin America is
more likely with closer EU integration in the future. An assessment of FDI in
different sectors and the underlying motivations of foreign investors may offer
some valuable insights in this respect.
2
3 This is because the potential of FDI
diversion can reasonably be assumed to differ widely between various types of
FDI (Agarwal 1994).
The underlying motives of FDI are basically the following three: (i) to draw on
raw materials and natural resources available in the host country, (ii) to serve the
domestic markets of host countries or regions, and (iii) to use overseas locations
as platforms for global sourcing and marketing. The subsequent discussion will
show that FDI diversion is hardly a relevant issue in the former two areas. FDI
diversion may be a threat in the third area. However, it largely depends on Latin
America herself whether it will actually occur.
As concerns resource-based FDI, Latin America is highly unlikely to suffer
from FDI diversion in favour of prospective EU members among CEECs. With
few exceptions, these countries do not offer promising investment opportunities in
the mineral sector. Rather, most of them heavily depend on imports of minerals
23 For a comprehensive analysis of investors' motivations and possible FDI diversion effects,
'
;seeMichalet(1997).21
and other raw materials. From an endowment point of view, the situation is
different in agriculture, where investment opportunities may exist. Yet, the
available evidence suggests that the primary sector as a whole remained a
negligible target of FDI in prospective EU member countries in the early 1990s
(Agarwal 1994: Table 4). This is unlikely to change unless the restrictive CAP is
reformed fundamentally.
In contrast to prospective EU members among CEECs, various successor
states of the USSR do offer vast investment opportunities in the primary sector
because of their favourable endowment of natural resources. This may induce a
larger degree of FDI diversion if the EU strengthens its ties with these countries.
Nevertheless, Latin America is unlikely to be affected significantly. First, for the
time being, FDI conditions in successor states of the USSR remain clouded by
economic and political uncertainty. Second, various Latin American host
countries have little to lose. In Brazil and Mexico, for example, the primary sector
as a whole accounted for about 2 percent of total FDI stocks in 1994 (IADB and
IRELA 1996: Table 8). Third, FDI diversion may be a minor concern even in
Latin American countries where the primary sector figures prominently in total
FDI stocks.
2
4 Resource-based FDI tends to be highly location-specific. This
2
4 Examples are: Bolivia (76 percent), Chile (59 percent), Colombia (61 percent), and
Ecuador (51 percent). The degree to which EU investors are engaged in the primary
sector of these countries cannot be identified from the available data.22
means that FDI diversion is conceivable only among countries offering the same
quality of a particular commodity.
FDI for serving the domestic markets of host countries (in UNCTAD's jargon,
market seeking FDI) seems to account for the bulk of FDI in Latin America
(Nunnenkamp 1997a). This is a plausible assumption, although the available data
do not allow for a clear distinction between market seeking FDI and FDI
undertaken in the context of global sourcing and marketing (efficiency seeking
FDI):
- The service sector, where the production of non-tradables is clearly dominant,




- Enterprise surveys and regression analyses reveal that the size and growth of
host country markets have been major stimuli to FDI in manufacturing. This
applies especially to Latin America, where lasting import substitution strategies
provided a disincentive to efficiency seeking FDI in the past. The low share of
manufactured goods in Latin American exports to the EU (see Section II.2)
5 The share of the service sector in total FDI stocks in 1994 was around 40 percent in
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, while it was about 25 percent in Chile (IADB and IRELA
1996: Table 8). Moreover, recent FDI flows to various Latin American countries were
. heavily concentrated in services, which was largely because of privatisation programmes
' .(Nunnenkamp 1997a).23
underscores that EU FDI in manufacturing has primarily been market seeking
in this region.
The sectoral distribution of FDI in several CEECs suggests that, similar to
Latin America, market seeking FDI was dominant in the early 1990s (Agarwal
1994: 12). This is corroborated by recent survey results (OECD 1993; Michalet
1997). Most probably, this similarity between Latin America and CEECs greatly
reduces the scope for FDI diversion. It is hardly conceivable that EU investors
will give up important markets in Latin America, simply because of new market
opportunities in CEECs. Rather, one can expect additional FDI if different
regions offer favourable market prospects.
2
6 This view is supported by the recent
boom of FDI in the service sector of various countries in Latin America, in
Central and Eastern Europe and in other regions, after these countries had joined
the worldwide trend towards privatisation and deregulation of services.
It follows that, as far as market seeking FDI is concerned, it depends on the
economic prospects of Latin American countries, rather than on the future course
of EU integration, whether the recent recovery of FDI flows to the region will be
sustained. This is not to ignore that the prominence of market seeking FDI
involves certain risks for Latin America. Indirectly, it may put Latin American
Additional FDI may be associated with relatively lower domestic investment in EU
countries. In contrast to FDI diversion, one may call this "FDI creation" (in analogy to
trade creation).24
economies at a disadvantage in competing for the third type of FDI, i.e.,
efficiency seeking FDI.
In the era of globalisation, efficiency seeking FDI is considered to be the
hallmark of the response of multinational corporations to the changing
international environment (UNCTAD 1996: 97). The size of host country
markets, as one of the most important traditional FDI determinants, is expected to
decrease in relative importance. Under such conditions, Latin America may be
handicapped vis-a-vis other regions.
Globalisation may shift the FDI balance further towards Asia. Various Asian
countries are well-known for their world market orientation which puts them in a
favourable position to compete for efficiency seeking FDI. By contrast, Latin
American countries may still be suffering from insufficient international
competitiveness of manufacturing industries that were established under
conditions of import substitution. At the same time, the recent move towards
trade liberalisation in Latin America tends to weaken the incentives of foreign
investors to undertake market seeking FDI in this region in order to jump over
protectionist fences.
It may also prove more difficult for Latin America than for CEECs to attract
efficiency seeking FDI. The recent surge of market seeking FDI in CEECs
occurred at a time when these host countries liberalised their foreign trade25
regimes substantially. Hence, the existing FDI stock in CEECs is probably more
in line with these countries' comparative advantage than in the case of Latin
American countries. This could render it relatively easy for CEECs to switch
from market seeking to efficiency seeking FDI. CEECs have two additional
advantages in attracting efficiency seeking FDI. Geographical proximity favours
CEECs in competing for this type of FDI from EU countries, as distance typically
involves higher transaction costs. Furthermore, preferential access to EU markets
provides an incentive to efficiency seeking FDI in CEECs.
It is in the area of efficiency seeking FDI where the largest potential of FDI
diversion exists. One may argue that this poses a threat to Asian countries, rather
than to Latin American countries, as world-market oriented host countries have
more to lose than domestic-market oriented host countries. Under conditions of
globalisation, however, overall FDI prospects seem to depend increasingly on
locational attractiveness for efficiency seeking FDI. If so, Latin American
economies have little choice but to prepare themselves for fiercer worldwide
competition for efficiency seeking FDI.
Important steps have already been taken by various Latin American countries
to reduce the risk of FDI diversion. Comprehensive reform programmes with
regard to macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment were
instrumental to the recent recovery of FDI flows to Latin America (Nunnenkamp26
1997a). The close link between reform-mindedness and FDI inflows supports the
view that the future prospects of Latin America in attracting efficiency seeking
FDI depend primarily on economic policies followed in this region, rather than on
the deepening and widening of EU integration. Several studies suggest that host
countries of FDI are most likely to participate successfully in globalised
production if (i) macroeconomic stability is sustained, (ii) openness towards
world markets is ensured, (iii) physical capital accumulation is encouraged, and
(iv) human capital formation figures high on the government's policy agenda
(Sachs and Warner 1995; Gundlach and Nunnenkamp 1996; Nunnenkamp 1996).
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Recent trade and FDI patterns suggest that EU widening to the East has limited
effects on Latin America. As concerns trade, CEECs and Latin American
countries have targeted different markets for their exports to the EU. Surprisingly
small trade overlaps imply that trade diversion resulting from EU integration and
negatively affecting Latin America is likely to be modest. This picture may
change somewhat when several CEECs become full members of the EU.
However, a dramatically different picture should not emerge in the future,
considering that possible changes work in opposite directions so that their effects
on trade diversion may cancel out each other:27
On the one hand, the potential of trade diversion will further decrease once the
Uruguay Round agreements are fully implemented. Preference margins for
CEECs will then be reduced, which contains trade diversion in "sensitive"
areas such as textiles and clothing. Furthermore, trade overlaps may become
even smaller in the future, if CEECs succeed in making better use of their
relatively favourable endowment of human capital and skilled labour. With
continued investment to replace the obsolete capital stock inherited from the
socialist past, the comparative advantage of CEECs will shift towards skill
intensive lines of production. Rising wages in CEECs during the process of
economic transformation and EU integration will reinforce structural change
towards more sophisticated manufacturing industries. The supply of CEECs on
EU markets may then become increasingly complementary, rather than
substitutive to Latin American supply.
On the other hand, full EU membership of some CEECs may induce more
trade diversion. Remaining trade barriers between these CEECs and current
EU members will be removed. In addition, CEECs are required to reduce their
(relatively high) protection against non-EU members to the (relatively low)
level of external protection of the current EU. Taken together, the free trade
area requirement and the customs union requirement may give rise to
considerable structural adjustment needs in new EU member countries among28
CEECs. Against this backdrop, these countries will probably address the EU to
consider their higher demand for protection when it comes to trade negotiations
with non-members. An extended EU may, thus, slow down the process of
extemal trade liberalisation, especially during the period of structural
adjustment in CEECs to import pressure from both current EU members and
non-EU countries (Langhammer and Nunnenkamp 1993).
It is almost impossible to strike a balance between these opposing influences,
let alone assessing the net impact on particular external trading partners of the EU
such as Latin American economies. Even if trade diversion becomes more likely,
new opportunities for trade will emerge simultaneously. For example, Latin
America may be adversely affected if the EU becomes more reluctant to liberalise
extra-EU trade. Nevertheless, Latin American suppliers will benefit from better
access to still highly protected markets of CEECs, once the latter are members of
the customs union. This may help increase the extremely low share of Central and
Eastern Europe in total Latin American exports (1994: 0.3 percent, excluding
former USSR; UN 1996).
Similar to trade, there are certain risks that Latin America will be affected by
FDI diversion. For several reasons, however, such risks should not be overrated.
Worldwide FDI flows have never been — and are most unlikely to become — a
zero-sum game. The recent surge of FDI flows to various host countries and29
regions, including many Latin American economies, indicates that new
investment opportunities induce additional FDI, rather than leading to FDI
diversion.
Furthermore, fears of FDI diversion tend to be greatly exaggerated unless it is
taken into account that overall FDI is far from being a uniform phenomenon.
Different motivations are underlying resource-based FDI, market seeking FDI and
efficiency seeking FDI. The threat of FDI diversion is essentially restricted to
efficiency seeking FDI. One may expect that this type of FDI is becoming
increasingly important in the era of globalisation, whereas one of the most
important traditional FDI determinants, namely the size of host country markets,
may become less relevant. This would definitely involve a major challenge for
Latin America, where the bulk of FDI has traditionally been market seeking.
It primarily depends on economic policies pursued by Latin American
governments whether this challenge will be met. For Latin America to become
more closely involved in globalised production, and thereby improve the
prospects of attracting FDI, the following factors should be of priority concern:
sustained macroeconomic stability, openness towards world markets, and
accumulation of physical and human capital.
As it seems, many Latin American countries are in the process of restoring
their international competitiveness and attractiveness for FDI. Sustained30
economic policy reforms can be regarded as Latin America's contribution to
prospering economic relations with the EU. The EU's most important contribution
would be to ensure open markets for non-members, including Latin American
countries, and to play a constructive role in maintaining a liberal multilateral
trading system. EU widening to the East does involve some risk for external trade
liberalisation, but the threat of more inward-looking policies of the EU may still
increase if EU integration does not proceed smoothly.31
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